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9. Selected Title Issues
Paul A. Strickland
Hargrove, Smelley, Strickland & Langley
Shreveport, Louisiana
I. General Rules of Contractual Interpretation
A. General Rules from Louisiana Civil Code Articles
1. Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common
intent of the parties. La. Civ. Code art. 2045.
2. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to
no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search
of the parties' intent. La. Civ. Code art. 2046.
3. The words of a contract must be given their generally
prevailing meaning. Words of art and techrijcal terms must be given their
technical meaning when the contract involves a technical matter. La. Civ.
Code art. 2047.
4. Words susceptible of different meanings must be interpreted as
having the meaning that best conforms to the object of the contract. La.
Civ. Code art. 2048.
5. A provision susceptible of different meanings must be
interpreted with a meaning that renders it effective and not with one that
renders it ineffective. La. Civ. Code art. 2049.
6. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the
other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the
contract as a whole. La. Civ. Code art. 2050.
7. Although a contract is worded in general terms, it must be
interpreted to cover only those things it appears the parties intended to
include. La. Civ. Code art. 2051.
8. When the parties intend a contract of general scope but, to
eliminate doubt, include a provision that describes a specific situation,
interpretation must not restrict the scope of the contract to that situation
alone. La. Civ. Code art. 2052.
9. A doubtful provision must be interpreted in light of the nature
of the contract, equity, usages, the conduct of the parties before and after
the formation of the contract, and of other contracts of a like nature
between the same parties. La. Civ. Code art. 2053.
10. When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it
must be assumed that they intended to bind themselves not only to the
express provisions of the contract, but also to whatever the law, equity,
or usage regards as implied in a contract of that kind or necessary for the
contract to achieve its purpose. La. Civ. Code art. 2054.
- 292 -
1
Strickland: Selected Title Issues
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008
11. Equity, as intended in the preceding articles, is based on the
principles that no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and
that no one is allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of
another. Usage, as intended in the preceding articles, is a practice
regularly observed in affairs of a nature identical or similar to the object
of a contract subject to interpretation. La. Civ. Code art. 2055.
12. In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a provision
in a contract must be interpreted against the party who furnished its text.
A contract executed in a standard form of one party must be interpreted,
in case of doubt, in favor of the other party. La. Civ. Code art. 2056.
13. In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a contract
must be interpreted against the obligee and in favor of the obligor of a
particular obligation. Yet, if the doubt arises from lack of a necessary
explanation that one party should have given, or from negligence or fault
of one party, the contract must be interpreted in a manner favorable to
the other party whether obligee or obligor. La. Civ. Code art. 2057.
II. Property Descriptions
A. General Rules from Louisiana Civil Code Articles
1. The transfer or encumbrance of an immovable includes its
component parts. La. Civ. Code art. 469.
2. Component parts include the following:
a. Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the
ground, ,tanding timber, and unharvested crops or ungathered fruits
of trees when they belong to the owner of the ground. La. Civ. Code
art. 463.
b. Things incorporated into a tract of land so as to become an
integral part of the land. La. Civ. Code art. 465.
c. A general category of things permanently attached to a
building or other construction that cannot be removed without
substantial damage to themselves or the building or other
construction, or if, according to prevailing notions in society, they
are considered to be its component parts. La. Civ. Code art. 466.
3. The ownership of a thing includes by accession the ownership
of everything that it produces or is united with it, either naturally or
artificially. La. Civ. Code art. 482.
4. In tie absence of rights of other persons, the owner of a thing
acquires the ownership of its natural and civil fruits by accession. La.
Civ. Code art. 483.
a. Natural fruits are products of the earth or of animals. La.
Civ. Code art. 551.
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b. Civil fruits are revenues derived from a thing by operation
of law or by reason of a juridical act, such as rentals, interest, and
certain corporate distributions. La. Civ. Code art. 551.
c. Mineral substances extracted from the ground and the
proceeds of mineral rights are not fruits because their production
results in depletion of the property. Comment (c) to La. Civ. Code
art. 551. Mineral substances are considered to be products because
they are derived from a thing as a result of diminution of its
substance.
5. Unless otherwise provided by law, the ownership of a tract of
land carries with it the ownership of everything that is directly above or
under it. The owner may make works on, above, or below the land as he
pleases, and draw all the advantages that accrue from them, unless he is
restrained by law or by rights of others. La. Civ. Code art. 490.
B. General Rules from Louisiana Case Law
1. The deed conveying title to immovable property must contain a
description that properly identifies the property. Wilson v. Head, 707 So.
2d 127 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1998).
2. In order for the description of the property given to be
sufficient to transfer title to the immovable property, one must be able to
identify and locate the property from the description in the deed itself or
from other evidence appearing in the public records. McClendon v.
Thomas, 768 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2000).
3. The description of the property must fully appear within the
four corners of the instrument, unless the deed refers to a map, plat or
other deed as part of the description. Energy Development Corp. v.
Quality Environmental Processes, Inc., 777 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 5 Cir.
2000), writ denied, 786 So. 2d 734 (La. 2001).
4. Real estate may be transferred by name, such as a plantation,
farm or estate designated by a certain name, and when this is done, in
case of error in the tract described such as in bounds, the name of the
property will prevail. Succession of Simms, 371 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 3
Cir. 1979), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979).
5. A description of property as being bounded on various sides by
the estate of another is a sufficient description for purposes of just title
necessary for acquisitive prescription because this type of description is
susceptible of location and identification. Snelling v. Adair, 199 So. 782
(La. 1941); Authement v. Theriot, 292 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1974).
6. A description of land that refers to the lands of adjoining
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7. Onuibus provisions in deeds are sufficient to effectively
transfer immovables between the parties, but they are not sufficient to
give adequate notice to third parties.
Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., Ltd., 38 So. 2d 729 (La. 1948). The
language of the omnibus clause in this case reads as follows:
"The vendor herein declares that it is his true intent and purpose to
sell to the purchaser herein all the property owned by him in the
Parish of Lafourche. . . ."
The court found that this language of the description was sufficient to
transfer title to the immovable property as between the parties; however,
the description was not sufficient or specific enough to give notice to
third parties.
8. If the description in the deed refers to all land in two townships
without referring to sections or subdivisions, then the description is
inadequate to form the basis of a title translative of property. Waterman
v. Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co., 35 So. 2d 225 (La. 1948). In Waterman, the
plaintiffs tried to rely on a quitclaim deed to establish ten-year
acquisitive prescription by just title. The deed did not identify the
particular land; rather, it merely gave an omnibus description of two
entire townships comprising approximately 46,080 acres of land. The
court found that this description was inadequate to be considered a title
translative of property.
9. Unless rights are expressly reserved, the conveyance of land
includes all incidents of ownership, including any mineral rights. Hayden
v. Phillips, 646 So. 2d 1014 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994), writ denied, 651 So.
2d 291 (La. 1995); Rosewood Resources, Inc. v. Jonesboro State Bank,
535 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1988).
10. In c nstruing ambiguous or uncertain descriptive terms of
deeds, the court will give them a construction against the grantor and in
favor of the grmtee with respect to the quantity of land conveyed. United
States v. 12,9'8.28 Acres of Land in Webster Parish, Louisiana, 61 F.
Supp. 545 (D.C. La. 1945).
11. Where property is described in'reference to an attached plat,
and where there is a conflict between the worded description and the
plat, the plat controls. Citizens National Bank v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 597 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992).
12. In tlde case of an inconsistency with the description of the
property in the deed, a map controls over a metes and bounds
description, and a metes and bounds description controls over a general
description. Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1949).
13. If a map or a survey is attached to the deed, the map controls
the worded description of the deed if there is a conflict. Casso v.
Ascension Realty Co., 196 So. I (La. 1940); Buras v. United Gas Pipe
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Line Co., 127 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1961); Ganus v. Cuoco, 351
So. 2d 224 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 23 1048 (La.
1978).
14. The order of importance of calls which may be included in a






Kimbrough v. Hirsch, 736 So. 2d 871 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1999).
15. If a deed contains both a specific and a general description of
the property, and there is a conflict, then the specific description will
generally prevail. Arab Corp. v. Bruce, 142 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1944).
16. When a person sells by fixed boundaries, the purchaser
acquires all the property within the boundaries regardless of the quantity
called for and even though, in so doing, he receives an excess of property
over that described in the instrument. Lafayette Parish Police Jury v.
Perroncel, 212 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1968).
17. When the identity of the land excepted from the sale cannot be
established, the exception, and not the entire deed, is void. Stutts v.
Humphries, 408 So. 2d 940 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1981).
18. When interpreting deeds, the court must first seek to determine
the intent of the parties without referring to any extrinsic evidence;
however, if the description is so ambiguous as to make it impossible to
ascertain the parties' intent, then the court may resort to extrinsic
evidence to aid in construction. Marsh Cattle Farms v. Vining, 707 So.
2d 11l (La. App. 2 Cir. 1998), writ denied, 717 So. 2d 1167 (La. 1998);
Williams v. Hawthorne, 601 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1992).
C. Specific Rules from Louisiana Revised Statutes
1. It shall be conclusively presumed that any transfer,
conveyance, surface lease, mineral lease, mortgage or any other contract
or grant affecting land described as fronting on or bounded by, or as
described pursuant to a survey or using a metes and bounds
description that shows that it actually fronts on or is bounded by a
waterway, canal, highway, road, street, alley, railroad, or other right-of-
way, shall be construed to include all of the grantor's interest in and
under such waterway, road, street, etc., in the absence of any express
provision therein particularly excluding the same therefrom; provided
that, if the seller owns the land on both sides thereof and makes a transfer
affecting land situated on only one side thereof, it shall then be
conclusively presumed, in the absence of any express provision therein
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particularly excluding the same therefrom, that the transfer shall include
the seller's interest to the center of such waterway, canal, highway, road,
etc. See La. R.S. 9:2971 (added by Acts 1956 and amended by Acts
2003). (Note: the bolded language was added by Acts 2003).
a. .his statute providing that the transfer of land bounded by
a road inc udes all of the transferor's interest in the road cannot be
retroactively applied to transfers of ownership executed prior to
1956, the date the statute was made effective. State Department of
Highways v. Tucker, 170 So. 2d 371 (La. 1964).
b. Before the statute was amended in 2003, courts held that
the presumption that the transfer included all of grantor's interest in
and under such road was not applicable to deeds which were
intended to convey only the property within the exact and precise
limits of the surveyed description. Before 2003, only transfers
which described the property transferred as fronting on or bounded
by a right of way were subject to the presumption. Crown
Zellerback Corp. v. Heck, 407 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1981).
2. Any transfer, grant, sale or mortgage of land and property
abutting or contiguous to an abandoned road, street or alley shall be
construed to include all of the grantor/mortgagor's interest in and to the
abandoned road, street or alley, unless otherwise expressly excluded. See
La. R.S. 9:2981 (added by Acts 1958).
3. Road Dedications in Subdivision Plats
a. Louisiana Revised Statute 33:5051 governs the creation of
subdivisionis and requires, inter alia, that the filed subdivision plat
(1) provide the section, township and range in which the subdivision
is located, (2) describe the dimensions of the various lots and
reference the lots by lot numbers and (3) be certified and signed by
a registered surveyor.
b. Streets and roads described on subdivision plats which
have been filed for record and which are in substantial compliance
with Louisiana Revised Statute 33:5051 are statutorily dedicated to
the public. Statutory dedication of a street or road for public use
vests full ownership, including the minerals, in the public. Boutte
Assembly 9f God, Inc. v. Champagne, 777 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 5
Cir. 2000),
c. As a general rule, recordation of a survey which shows a
highway iraversing a subdivision is a statutory dedication, even
though the road pre-existed the subdivision and was tacitly
dedicated to public use. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson, 226 So. 2d
774 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1969), writ denied, 227 So. 2d 593 (La. 1969).
d. However, it has been held that when an existing right of
way or highway which merely borders the subdivided area is shown
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on the survey or subdivision plat, no dedication has occurred.
Pioneer Production Corp. v. Segraves, 326 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3
Cir. 1976), affirmed by, 340 So. 2d 270 (La. 1976).
D. Conveyance of a Servitude or Full Ownership of a Strip of Land
A question can arise as to whether certain instruments convey a strip
of land or merely a servitude.
1. "A right of way may consist either of the fee, or merely of a
right of passage and use, or servitude. Whether the one or the other is
meant in any particular instrument must be gathered from the instrument
as a whole. As a general rule, a servitude is meant." John T. Moore
Planting Co. v. Morgan's Louisiana & B.R. & S.S. Co., 53 So. 22 (La.
1908).
2. The Louisiana Supreme Court has used the following general
principles when determining whether a strip of land or servitude has been
conveyed:
a. In considering the instrument as a whole to determine the
intent of the parties, all provisions must be given effect if possible.
Noel Estate v. Kansas City Southern & Gulf Ry. Co., 175 So. 468
(La. 1937).
b. Use of the phrase "right of way" is considered, but does
not necessarily mean that the conveyance is limited to a servitude.
Arkansas Improvement Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 181
So. 445 (La. 1938).
c. If the use granted is restricted (as in limiting the use to
highway purposes), that is an indication a servitude was intended.
Jones Island Realty Co. v. Middendorf 185 So. 881 (La. 1939).
d. In granting a servitude, it is not unusual for the instrument
to contain language generally used in a sale of land, qualified by
clauses designating a servitude. Noel Estate v. Kansas City Southern
& GulfRy. Co., 175 So. 468 (La. 1937).
e. The term "in perpetuity" indicates a servitude, while the
term "forever" indicates a conveyance of fee title. Arkansas
Improvement Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 181 So. 445 (La.
1938).
f. A restricted or limited purpose (as "for railroad purposes")
is not consistent with a fee simple title conveyance and indicates a
servitude. Noel Estate v. Kansas City Southern & Gulf Ry. Co., 175
So. 468 (La. 1937). But, this is not a hard and fast rule. See
Arkansas Improvement Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 181
So. 445 (La. 1938).
g. A reversionary clause to take effect when the land is
abandoned for the purpose the instrument is granted indicates a
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servitude. Noel Estate v. Kansas City Southern & Gulf Ry. Co., 175
So. 468 (La. 1937).
h. Consideration must be adequate enough to be consistent
with the idei of a sale of fee simple title for the instrument to be
considered such a sale. Noel Estate v. Kansas City Southern & Gulf
Ry. Co., 175 So. 468 (La. 1937).
i. Abandonment by the grantor indicates conveyance of fee,
while abandonment by the grantee indicates conveyance of a
servitude. Arkansas Improvement Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry.
Co., 181 So. 445 (La. 1938).
j. "[T]he conveyance of a right of way is to be regarded as a
mere servitude and not as a transfer of a fee-simple title of the land
unless the deed itself evidences that the parties intended otherwise."
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ellerbe, 6 So. 2d 556 (La. 1942).
k. Assessment and payment of taxes is relevant if extrinsic
evidence is ,considered. Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. Gournay, 17
So. 2d 8 (La. 1944).
1. The use of such a phrase as "over and upon" indicates a
limited grant. Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. Gournay, 17 So. 2d 8
(La. 1944).
m. Ar additional provision granting other rights (as to take
earth, gravel, timber, etc.) indicates a servitude, for it would be
unnecessary to state these rights in a conveyance of fee title. Rock
Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. Gournay, 17 So. 2d 8 (La. 1944).
n. Ar. additional provision granting the right to take earth,
gravel, timbe-r, etc., and providing that the compensation paid for
the instrument was adequate to cover damages is indicative that fee
title was not conveyed, because the grantee would not owe itself any
additional compensation for damages done to its own land. Rock
Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. Gournay, 17 So. 2d 8 (La. 1944).
III. Warranty of Title
A. General Rules from Louisiana Civil Code Articles
1. The seller warrants the buyer against eviction, which is the
buyer's loss of, or danger of losing, the whole or part of the thing sold
because of a third person's right that existed at the time of the sale. The
warranty also covers encumbrances on the thing that were not declared at
the time of the sale, with the exception of apparent servitudes and natural
and legal nonapparent servitudes, which need not be declared. La. Civ.
Code art. 2500.
2. The warranty against eviction is implied in every sale, but it
may be modified by the parties. La. Civ. Code art. 2503.
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3. The warranty against eviction also extends to those things that
proceed from the thing sold, which things include fruits and products. La.
Civ. Code art. 2512.
B. General Rules from Louisiana Case Law .
1. A vendor/seller of mineral interests, like a vendor of
immovable property, is obligated to warrant merchantable title to the
vendee/buyer. Huckabay v. Keahey, 600 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1992).
2. A mineral servitude, in the absence of visible signs of its use, is
a nonapparent servitude burdening the land that must be declared by the
seller of the land to the purchaser under a warranty deed or otherwise
revealed to the purchaser to avoid the effect of the warranty. Dillon v.
Morgan, 362 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1978); Richmond v. Zapata
Development Corp., 350 So. 2d 875 (La. 1977).
C. Example of "Warranty" v. "Reservation"
A sells land to B and reserves 1/2 of the minerals. B later sells land
to C with warranty and reserves 1/2 of the minerals without mentioning
A's prior reservation. Who gets what?
1. In general, warranty takes precedence over a reservation. B
warranted to C that B owned full title to the property, including the
minerals, and would only be reserving 1/2 of the total minerals on the
property. In this situation, because the warranty controls over the
reservation, A is entitled to 1/2 of the minerals and C is entitled to the
other 1/2 of the minerals. B gets nothing because of his warranty to C
that C would acquire 1/2 of the minerals. See Dillon above.
2. But note that in Richmond v. Zapata Development Corp., 350
So. 2d 875 (La. 1977), the court found that, where there were various
drilling structures on the land, buyer under a warranty deed who made no
pre-sale inspection could not recover in warranty from his vendor who
failed to disclose the existence of a mineral lease. Specifically, the court
held that "an undisclosed mineral lease which produces on the property
ample signs of its existence is a real charge of which it is the buyer's
business not to be ignorant and against which he cannot claim warranty."
D. Quitclaim Deeds
General Rules from Louisiana Case Law:
1. A quitclaim deed is one which purports to transfer the interests
which the grantor may have, if any, at the time of the transaction, and it
excludes any implication that he has any title or interest in the described
property. Sabine Production Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 432 So.
2d 1047 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983), writ denied, 438 So. 2d 570 (La. 1983).
2. In other words, quitclaim deeds convey whatever title the
grantor owns. Osborn v. Johnston, 322 So. 2d 112 (La. 1975).
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3. A quitclaim deed does not convey property itself; it effectively
conveys such title or interest the grantor has at the time the deed is given.
Sabourin v. Jilek, 128 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1961); Evans v.
Waguespack, 638 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994).
4. A deed which conveys to the purchaser "any right, title, and
interest which the vendors might have" in and to conveyed property is
also an act which is sufficient to transfer title, and the fact that the
property is transferred without warranty does not preclude title from
being valid. Cliton v. Liner, 552 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989).
E. Words/phrases included in deeds which modify the seller's
warranty or exclude property from the sale.
1. "Subject io"
a. When the words "subject to" are used, as with "less"
below, the deed conveys the entirety of the land subject only to a
servitude and does not except the land underlying the servitude from
the sale. Welsh Southern Oil Co. v. Scurlock Oil Co., 201 So. 2d 376
(La. App. 3 Cir. 1967).
b. The mention of the words "subject to" and "less" in a deed
operates as an acknowledgment of the particular servitude being
described and therefore removes the servitude from the seller's
warranty. Hendrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 212 So. 2d 745, 747 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1968).
c. The "subject to" clause is generally used to avoid liability
of the grantor on his warranty.
d. Louisiana courts have interpreted the phrase "subject to"
as the recognition of rights previously in existence rather than the
creation of new rights. Patton v. Frost Lumber Industries, 147 So.
33 (La. 1933).
2. "Less"
a. The words "less the right of way" operated only as an
acknowledgment of the existence of a right of way servitude; the
entire tract described in the deed, including the land under the right
of way, was conveyed in the sale. Hendrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.,
212 So. 2d 74!; (La. App. 2 Cir. 1968).
b. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "less a right
of way 100 feet. in width reserved," meant that an easement was
established and that all of the property described in the deed,
including the property under the right of way, was conveyed.
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Marietta Oil Corp., 102 F.2d 603
(5th Cir. 1939).
3. "Less and Except"
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a. The term "less and except" generally means that a smaller
tract is excepted (or carved out) from a larger tract. Succession of
Brassette v. Armand, 799 So. 2d 816, 818 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2001).
b. When the words "less and except" are used, the indication
is that a portion of the property is omitted or excluded from the sale.
See generally In re Huber Oil of Louisiana, Inc., 311 B.R. 440
(Bkrtcy. WD La. 2004).
c. Example of "less" v. "less and except":
A landowner owns a tract of land. A portion of the land is
expropriated by the government in order for the government to
construct a highway. The landowner is left with a mineral
servitude under the expropriated portion of his land. The
landowner then sells his land to another, and in the deed, the
language reads, "less that portion of land subject to
expropriation."
The question becomes what exactly was included in the
deed? By using the term, "less," the effect will be that the
buyer takes the entire tract owned by the landowner, including
the minerals under the highway.
Had the deed used the language, "less and except," the
original landowner may still own the mineral rights underlying
the highway because that portion would have been carved out
of the tract sold to the buyer.
Furthermore, if the deed had used the language, "less and
except the rights expropriated," the new landowner arguably
may own the mineral rights underlying the highway because
the "rights expropriated" included no mineral rights.
4. "Reserve"
a. A landowner may convey, reserve, or lease his right to
explore and develop his land for production of minerals and to
reduce them to possession. La. R.S. 31:15.
b. "Reservation" is defined as the creation on behalf of the
grantor of some new right issuing out of the thing which did not
exist as an independent right before the grant. Demoss v. Sample, 78
So. 482 (La. 1918).
c. If the language making the exception or reservation in a
deed is doubtful, it must be construed most favorably to the grantee.
Doyal v. Pickett, 628 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1993).
d. It is unclear whether a mineral servitude is created when a
clause reads as follows: "This sale is made subject to a reservation
of all of the minerals."
-302-
11
Strickland: Selected Title Issues
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008
IV. General Rules of Interpretation Regarding the
Term "Minerals" and Variations Thereof
A. General Rules from Louisiana Mineral Code Articles
1. The provisions of this Code are applicable to all forms of
minerals, including oil and gas. They are also applicable to rights to
explore for or irine or remove from land the soil itself, gravel, shells,
subterranean water, or other substances occurring naturally in or as a part
of the soil or geological formations on or underlying the land. La. R.S.
31:4.
2. Ownership of land includes all minerals occurring naturally in
a solid state. Solid minerals are insusceptible of ownership apart from the
land until reduced to possession. La. R.S. 31:5.
3. Ownership of land does not include ownership of oil, gas, and
other minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form, or of any
elements or compounds in solution, emulsion, or association with such
minerals. The landowner has the exclusive right to explore and develop
his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them to
possession and ownership. La. R.S. 31:6.
B. General Rules of Interpretation from Louisiana Case Law
1. The te n "mineral" is not a definite one and instead is
susceptible of limitation according to the intention of the parties using it,
the language of the deed in which it occurs, and the relative positions of
the parties. Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 9 So. 2d 228 (La. 1942).
In Holloway, the court interpreted a reservation of "all the mineral,
oil and gas rights." The court stated that this reservation meant the same
as if it had read, "mineral rights, oil rights and gas rights." Therefore, the
court said that the reservation should be confined to things of the same
nature. To aid in the interpretation of the clause, the court considered the
negotiations that took place as to the reservation, activity in the area, the
burden that would be put on the owner of the land if sand and gravel
were included, and who prepared the instruments. Ultimately, the court
determined that sand and gravel were not included in the reservation.
2. In Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co. Ltd., 91 So.
676 (La. 1922), the Louisiana Supreme Court attempted to determine the
intent of the parties when interpreting what was included within the
language, "iron, coal, and other minerals." The reservation of "iron, coal,
and other minerals" was made subject to the rule of ejusdem generia,
which requires that the words "other minerals" be construed to include
other minerals of a character similar to coal and iron, such as solids or
minerals in place that require mining for removal.
3. In River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of
Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1976), the court had to
decide whether a Bath form oil, gas and mineral lease included the right
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to strip-mine lignite coal. The court interpreted the standard form lease to
give the right to explore for and produce minerals of the same physical
properties as oil and gas, which meant those minerals that are produced
in liquid or gaseous form by drilling wells into the subsurface and not
other minerals such as lignite coal that require mining for removal.
4. A reservation of "all mineral rights," with no other qualifying
language, was interpreted to include hard minerals as well as those
minerals that are produced in liquid-or gaseous form by drilling wells
into the subsurface. Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d 428
(La. 1981), writ denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982).
The language used in the contract of sale read, "there is expressly
excluded from this sale, and the vendor reserves, all mineral rights in the
lands conveyed hereunder...." On rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme
Court conceded that the phrase, "all mineral rights," is ambiguous and
the court referred to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent
with respect to what was meant to be included within the reservation.
Because the parties in this case specifically discussed whether to restrict
the reservation or leave it broadly worded, the court found that the
parties ultimately intended for lignite and other solid minerals to be
included in the broad reservation of "all mineral rights."
5. In West v. Godair, 542 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1989), the court
interpreted a reservation that had been made of an undivided 1/2 interest
in and to "all of the minerals of every nature or kind situated in, on and
under the hereinabove described property." The issue in this case was
whether sand, gravel, topsoil and pit run were considered "minerals"
under the reservation quoted above. The trial court held that hard
minerals were included in the reservation; the appellate court reversed
and held that hard minerals were not included in the reservation; and the
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the
opinion of the trial court without opinion.
At the trial court level, the sellers who conveyed the property under
a cash warranty deed that contained a mineral rights reservation argued
that sand, gravel, topsoil and pit run were included within the mineral
rights reservation. The reservation contained the language quoted above.
The issue over what was included within the reservation arose when the
sellers demanded an accounting of all pit run, field dirt, wash gravel, top
soil and sand mined or removed from the property the buyers acquired.
The trial court agreed with the sellers and found that the doctrine of
ejusdem generis was inapplicable to the case and that the intent of the
parties concerning the mineral reservation was not helpful since the
parties did not discuss the subject.
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C. Common Problem Areas
1. MineraI Royalty or Mineral Servitude
Instruments are often ambiguous as to whether a mineral servitude
or a mineral royalty is conveyed or reserved.
a. General Rules from the Louisiana Mineral Code
(1) A mineral royalty is the right to participate in production
of minerals from land owned by another or land subject to a mineral
servitude owned by another. Unless expressly qualified by the
parties, a rcyalty is a right to share in gross production free of
mining or drilling and production costs. La. R.S. 31:80.
(2) The owner of a mineral royalty has no executive rights;
nor does he have the right to conduct operations to explore for or
produce minerals. However, a mineral servitude owner has the right
to enjoy the land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring
for and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and
ownership. See La. R.S. 31:81 and 31:21.
(3) A mineral royalty and a mineral servitude are extinguished
by prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years. See La. R.S.
31:85(1) and 31:27.
(4) Prescription of nonuse of a mineral royalty and a mineral
servitude commence from the date on which it is created. See La.
R.S. 31:86 and 31:28.
(5) Prescription of nonuse running against a mineral royalty is
interrupted by the production of any mineral covered by the act
creating the royalty. Prescription is interrupted on the date on which
actual production begins and commences anew from the date of
cessation of actual production. La. R.S. 31:87.
(6) To interrupt prescription running against a mineral royalty
it is not necessary that minerals be produced in paying quantities but
only that they actually be produced and saved. However, to interrupt
prescription unning against a mineral servitude, it is only necessary
to have gooc. faith operations for the discovery and production of
minerals. See La. R.S. 31:88 and 31:29.
b. Thus, the owner of a mineral servitude has the right to
receive bonus, rentals, and shut-in rentals, and has the right to
execute mineral leases. A royalty owner has the right to receive
royalties and shut-in royalties, and has no right to execute mineral
leases. Furthermore, the rules for interruption of prescription
running against a mineral servitude are different from the rules for
interruption of prescription running against a mineral royalty
interest, as is indicated above.
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c. The Louisiana Supreme Court has found that the
following language conveys/reserves a mineral interest (servitude):
(1) One instrument read, "An undivided 1/2 interest in and to
all the oil, gas, sulphur and other minerals of every character in, on
or under or that may be produced from the following described
property .. . to have and to hold . .. the said 1/2 interest in and to . .
. with the right of ingress and egress and possession at all times for
the purpose of mining, drilling, etc." Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana
v. Futral, 15 So. 2d 65 (La. 1943).
(2) Another instrument read, "1/64 of all the oil, gas, sulphur,
and other minerals in and under, and that may be produced and
saved from the following described land...." Standard Oil Co. of
Louisiana v. Futral, 15 So. 2d 65 (La. 1943).
(3) "There is excepted from this conveyance and reserved
unto The Federal Land Bank of New-Orleans a 1/2 mineral interest
in and to all minerals and mineral rights in and under [note: does not
say "and that may be produced from"] the above described property.
It is provided, however, that the purchaser is hereby granted the
privilege of leasing the minerals and mineral rights, including the
said reserved interest, without joinder of The Federal Land Bank of
New Orleans on the following conditions, to-wit...."
The court found that the bank "in unmistakable language"
reserved unto itself a 1/2 interest in and to all minerals and mineral
rights, which constituted a servitude giving the owner thereof the
right of ingress and egress for the purpose of exploring for and
reducing to possession the minerals thereunder. The court found the
right to execute mineral leases, which the bank conveyed to the
grantee, to be a mandate coupled with an interest, observing that
only the owner of minerals has the right to grant such a leasing
privilege. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co, 70 So. 2d 657 (La. 1954).
d. The Louisiana Supreme Court has found that the
following language conveys/reserves a mineral royalty:
(1) ". . . said Mrs. Edna Gibson retains 1/64 royalty in all oil,
gas and mineral rights in the above described lands." GulfRefining
Co. v. Goode, 32 So. 2d 904 (La. 1947).
(2) "1/32 of the whole of any oil, gas or other minerals,
except sulphur, on and under and to be produced from said lands,
delivery of said royalties to be made to the purchaser herein in the
same manner as is provided for the delivery of royalties by any
present or future mineral lease affecting said lands." Continental Oil
Co. v. Landry, 41 So. 2d 73 (La. 1949).
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Questions can arise as to whether certain language contained in a
deed is intended to fix the duration of a mineral servitude or to alter the
prescriptive period that would otherwise be applicable.
a. Geneial Rules from the Louisiana Mineral Code Articles
(1) Unless expressly or impliedly prohibited from doing so,
individuah may renounce or modify what is established in their
favor by the provisions of this Code if the renunciation or
modification does not affect the rights of others and is not contrary
to the public good. La. R.S. 31:3.
(2) A landowner may convey, reserve, or lease his right to
explore and develop his land for production of minerals and to
reduce them to possession. La. R.S. 31:15.
(3) The basic mineral rights that may be created by a
landowner are the mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the
mineral lease. This enumeration does not exclude the creation of
other mineral rights by a landowner. Mineral rights are real rights
and are subject either to the prescription of nonuse for ten years or
to special rules of law governing the term of their existence. La.
R.S. 31:16.
(4) A mineral servitude is extinguished by:
(a) prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years;
(b) confusion;
(c) renunciation of the servitude on the part of him to whom it
is due, or the express remission of his right;
(d) erpiration of the time for which the servitude was granted,
or the happening of the dissolving condition attached to the
servitude; or
(e) extinction of the right of him who established the
servitude. La. R.S. 31:27.
(5) Parties to an act creating a mineral servitude may alter the
applicable legal rules subject to the limitations provided in La. R.S.
31:73-79. La. R.S. 31:72.
(6) Parties may either fix the term of a mineral servitude or
shorten the applicable period of prescription of nonuse or both. If a
period of prescription greater than ten years is stipulated, the period
is reduced 1o ten years. La. R.S. 31:74.
b. General Rules from Louisiana Case Law
(1) When dealing with this issue, courts will look to the rules
of contractual interpretation to resolve any ambiguities. St. Mary
Operating Co. v. Champagne, 945 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 3 Cir.
2006), writ denied, 954 So. 2d 140 (La. 2007).
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(2) "A fixed term means that the mineral right will end at the
terminus of the number of years stated, regardless of whether
prescription might have been interrupted ... Even if parties create a
fixed term, it will still be subject to prescription if the right goes
unused for ten years from the date it was created." St. Mary
Operating Co. v. Champagne, 945 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 3 Cir.
2006), writ denied, 954 So. 2d 140 (La. 2007).
(3) If parties intend to create a mineral servitude for a fixed
term, that intention must be made by a clear affirmative statement.
See St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne, 945 So. 2d 846 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 2006), writ denied, 954 So. 2d 140 (La. 2007),
discussing the Comment to La. R.S. 31:74.
(4) The following language has been interpreted by a
Louisiana court to merely be a restatement of the default
prescriptive period:
"Vendors reserve unto themselves all of the minerals underlying
or which may be produced from the above described tracts for a
period of ten years, this being a reservation of royalties,
executive rights, bonuses, delay rentals, and all other mineral
rights whatsoever." St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne, 945
So. 2d 846 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2006), writ denied, 954 So. 2d 140
(La. 2007).
(5) The following language has been interpreted by a
Louisiana court as a conveyance of a mineral royalty for a term:
"This conveyance shall be for a period of Four (4) years & Six
(6) months from July 18, 1996, and as long thereafter as oil, gas
or other minerals are produced from said lands, or from lands
with which said lands are pooled or unitized, and also as long
thereafter as drilling or reworking operations are being
conducted on said lands, or on lands pooled or unitized
therewith, without more than 90 days cessation of operations . .."
It was argued that this language altered the rules of prescription
so that the lack of production on the servitude during the initial 4
years and 6 months caused the royalty to prescribe in favor of the
landowner. The court disagreed and interpreted the language to be a
conveyance of a mineral royalty for a term, with the option to
perpetuate the term by conducting certain drilling or reworking
operations. Lamaco, Inc. v. Hughes, 850 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 3 Cir.
2003), writ denied, 860 So. 2d 1156 (La. 2003).
(6) The following language was examined in the pre-Mineral
Code case of Hodges v. Norton, 8 So. 2d 618 (La. 1942):
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". . . and there is specially reserved, for a period of Fifteen years
fron, and after this date an undivided one-half interest in and to
all oil, gas and mineral rights. . . ."
Although noting that the prescriptive period could not be
extended beyond the ten years provided by law, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that this mineral servitude ended at the end of
the fifteen year term despite continuous production on the servitude
tract.
3. Mieral Acres
.When a mineral conveyance uses the term "mineral acre," several
problems can be created.
a. A mineral acre has been defined as all of the minerals on
and under one acre of land. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana
Minerai Servitudes, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1097 (1987).
b. In a Louisiana Supreme Court case, the mineral deed
contained the following language:
"1/16 of 8/8ths of the oil, gas and other minerals, in and under
and that may be produced from the following described property
... approximately 366 acres, more or less. (description omitted)
"It i the intention of the Vendor to convey and Vendee to
purchase sixty-one (61) mineral acres in and under the above
described lands." (emphasis added)
The court, noting the conflict between 1/16 mineral interest and
the 61/366 mineral acres (or 1/6), stated that documents with
conflicting provisions should be resolved against the party who
furnished the instrument. Light v. Crowson Well Service, Inc., 313
So. 2d 803 (La. 1975).
c. The following problems can also be created by using the
term "mineral acre":
(1) Assume that a mineral deed purports to convey 20 mineral
acres of a 40 acre tract. If the tract actually contains 42 acres, does
the grantee receive only 20 mineral acres regardless? Or, did the
parties intend to convey a fractional interest of the "actual acreage,"
20/40, bring 1/2 of the total?
(2) Assume that a mineral deed purports to convey 20 mineral
acres of a 40 acre tract. The deed further states that "it is the intent
of the parties to convey 1/2 of the oil, gas and other minerals." If the
tract aclually contains 42 acres, what interest is conveyed, 20
mineral acres or 1/2 of the oil, gas and other minerals (21/42
mineral acres)?
(3) Neither of these situations has come before a Louisiana
court, but based on the Light case, quoted above, it appears that, as
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with most contracts, Louisiana courts will use the basic principles of
contractual construction to resolve ambiguities that exist in mineral
deeds.
d. As a general rule, draftsmen should not use the term
"mineral acre" alone or in connection with a fraction. Luther L.
McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1097
(1987).
V. Successions and Related Matters
A. Administration of Community Property by a Succession
Representative
1. The usual purpose of an administration is to determine and
liquidate the obligations of the community in order to determine the net
assets and distribute them between the surviving spouse and the heirs of
the deceased. Succession of Sharp, 288 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1974), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 911 (La. 1974).
a. When a succession is not relatively free of debt,
community property, including the surviving spouse's 1/2 interest
therein, may be sold by the administrator of the deceased husband's
succession to pay the community debts. Poindexter v. Louisiana &
A. Ry. Co., 128 So. 297 (La. 1930).
b. A succession shall be deemed relatively free of debt when
its only debts are administration expenses, mortgages not in arrears,
and debts of the decedent that are small in comparison with the
assets of the succession. La. C.C.P. art. 3001.
c. Gauthier v. Gauthier, 502 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 3 Cir.
1987): Gerand Gauthier died on March 3, 1960 and Eunice
Broussard Gauthier, his widow, was appointed administratrix of his
succession. In her capacity as administratrix, she obtained court
authorization to sell a community immovable. The deed was signed
by Eunice Broussard Gauthier in her capacity as administratrix. She
did not sign in her individual capacity. Eunice subsequently passed
away, and her heirs brought suit alleging that she had only conveyed
the 1/2 interest owned by the succession in the above referenced
deed. In ruling that Eunice had conveyed not only the 1/2 interest
owned by the succession, but also her 1/2 interest, the court noted
the succession was not free of debt, and that the sale was authorized
to pay debts of the succession which were almost entirely
community debts. The court also noted that the property sold for
$8,500 which was the appraised value of the property, not a 1/2
interest.
d. Prejean v. First Mississippi Corporation, Inc., 506 So. 2d
885 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 508 So. 2d 69 (La. 1987)
(citing Succession of Caffarel, 378 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4 Cir.
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1979), writ refused, 381 So. 2d 509 (La. 1980)): According to
Prejean, Louisiana "jurisprudence has historically assumed that the
succession representative of a deceased spouse in community was
empowered to administer the surviving spouse's one-half interest in
the comminity."
In Prejean, Louis S. Prejean, Sr., died on April 27, 1974, and
Mary Ann Antrobus, one of his children, was appointed
administratrix of his succession. The succession of Louis S. Prejean,
Sr., was relatively free of debt. As administratrix, she applied for
and was given authority to grant a mineral lease on certain
succession property. Subsequently, Gusta Mae Bourg Prejean,
widow of the decedent, executed a mineral lease which purported to
cover her 1/2 interest in the property which was covered by the
original mineral lease. The sole issue in this case was whether a
mineral lease from a solvent succession covering property
belonging to the community formerly existing between the deceased
and his surviving spouse, encumbers the surviving spouse's 1/2
interest therein. Relying on Gauthier, the court noted that when a
succession is under administration, the surviving spouse's undivided
1/2 interest in the community is possessed by the administrator and
as such is under administration until the surviving spouse is placed
in possession by judgment of possession. Based on the foregoing,
the court ruled that the mineral lease executea by the administratrix,
prior to the judgment of possession and without opposition by the
surviving ;pouse, covered the undivided 1/2 interest of the surviving
spouse.
e. Succession of Pailet, 602 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 5 Cir.
1992): Ellemor Anderson Paxton Pailet died on December 27, 1987,
and her succession was placed under administration. At the time of
her death, the succession of her deceased husband, Sidney Pailet,
was also under administration. Both successions listed certain
immovables as community property. The administrator of the
Succession of Ellenor Anderson Paxton Pailet petitioned the court to
sell her 1/2 interest in certain of the community immovables. The
court determined that the Succession of Ellenor Anderson Paxton
Pailet could not alienate her 1/2 interest in the community
immovables prior to a judgment of possession being rendered in the
Successior. of Sidney Pailet.
2. Due Process Concerns: In the recent case of Mayo v. Doherty,
952 So. 2d 853 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2007), several heirs of Edward and
Virginia Milburn brought suit against the administrators of their
successions contending that their due process rights had been violated
and that the sale of succession property should be annulled because
certain of the heirs did not receive actual notice of the impending sale. In
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ruling against the heirs, the court distinguished several cases involving
tax sales where improper notice allowed the tax debtors to annul the sale
of their land. The court noted that in this case, the succession property
was merely converted to cash and the heirs could still make their claim to
their respective portions of the proceeds. The interests of all the heirs
was protected because the sale was under court supervision and there
was a court order setting the minimum price for the sale. The heirs in this
case had no claim that their due process rights had been violated because
they had not properly alleged any deprivation of property. Based on the
court's reasoning, the result may be different with an independent
executor because the independent executor can act "without the necessity
of delay for objection, or application to, or any action in or by, the
court." La. C.C.P. art. 3396.15.
B. Judgments of Possession
1. A judgment of possession shall:
a. recognize the petitioners as heirs, legatees, surviving
spouse, or usufructuary, as the case may be;
b. send the heirs and legatees into possession of the property
of the deceased; and
c. send the surviving spouse into possession of his undivided
one-half of the community, and of the other undivided one-half to
the extent he has the usufruct thereof. La. C.C.P. art. 3061.
2. Legal Effect of a Judgment of Possession. A judgment of
possession is only prima facie evidence of the relationship of the
deceased to the heirs or legatees and of their right to the possession of the
estate of the deceased. La. C.C.P. art. 3062.
a. Judgments of possession are not conclusive. Succession of
Feist, 287 So. 2d 514 (La. 1973).
b. Prima facie evidence is evidence that will establish a fact
or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced.
State ex rel. C.D., 971 So. 2d 496, 501 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2007).
c. A person claiming to be an heir of the deceased may
appeal from an ex parte judgment placing others into possession of
the estate and this remedy by appeal is independent of an action of
nullity, which can be maintained at the same time. David v. David,
347 So. 2d 885, 888 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1977).
3. Res Judicata. A judgment of possession is not a basis for the
plea of res judicata or conclusive evidence against persons having an
adverse interest in or a claim against the estate. Guidry v. Dufrene, 687
So. 2d 1044 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1996).
4. Reopening of Succession. After a judgment of possession is
entered, a succession may be reopened "if other property is discovered,
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or for any other proper cause." However, "the reopening of a succession
shall in no way adversely affect or cause loss to any bank, savings and
loan association or other person, firm or corporation, who has in good
faith acted in accordance with any order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in any previous succession proceedings." La.
C.C.P. art. 3393. There is no jurisprudence which discusses the
requirements for showing that an entity acted in "good faith." Also, note
that a court of competent jurisdiction must have rendered the judgment in
order for the protection to apply.
5. Description of Immovable Property. A particular description of
immovable property affected by a judgment of possession is not
required. La. C.C.P. art. 1919.
6. Basis Jr Acquisitive Prescription. A judgment of possession is
not a just title and cannot serve as a basis for ten year acquisitive
prescription. Boyet v. Perryman, 123 So. 2d 79 (1960).
7. Prescriptive Period to Assert Right of Inheritance. Louisiana
Civil Code article 3502 provides:
"An action for the recognition of a right of inheritance and recovery
of the whole or a part of a succession is subject to a liberative
prescription of thirty years. This prescription commences to run
from the day of the opening of the succession."
a. The comment to La. Civ. Code art. 3502 refers to La. Civ.
Code art. 934 for a method of determining the day of the "opening
of the succession." La. Civ. Code art. 934 states: "Succession occurs
at the death of a person."
b. A succession is opened upon the death, and all rights vest
at that time. Succession of Doll v. Doll, 593 So. 2d 1239, 1255 (La.
1992).
c. However, "coheirs or coowners do not as a general rule
acquire or lose by prescription against each other." Fleniken v.
Allbritton, 566 So. 2d 1106, 1113 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990).
d. Furthermore, "only an accepting co-heir or the transferee
of an accepting co-heir may assert such prescription against an
heir." Succession of Book, 426 So. 2d 769, 772 (La. App. 3 Cir.
1983).
8. Rights 9f Third Persons. La. R.S. 9:5630 provides:
"An action by a person who is a successor of a deceased person, and
who has nol been recognized as such in the judgment of possession
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, to assert an interest in
an immovable formerly owned by the deceased, against a third
person who has acquired an interest in the immovable by onerous
title from a person recognized as an heir or legatee of the deceased
in the judgment of possession, or his successors, is prescribed in two
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years from the date of the finality of the judgment of possession."
a. This statute protects only "a third person who has acquired
an interest in the immovable by onerous title." In other words, the
third person must have given consideration for his acquisition of the
immovable to be protected. The immovable is not protected if it is
still owned by the heir or legatee.
b. This statute does not protect a person who has acquired his
interest in the immovable from the heir or legatee by donation.
c. This statute also provides that thirty (30) years after a
judgment of possession is recorded, there shall be a conclusive
presumption that the judgment of possession was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
9. Judicial Estoppel. In Succession of Williams, 418 So. 2d 1317
(La. 1982), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the heir, who
participated in the succession proceeding causing the decedent's estate to
be distributed in a manner different than that provided by law, was
judicially estopped from subsequently attacking the judgment of
possession. This case was subsequently followed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Succession of Villarubia, 680 So. 2d 1147 (La. 1996),
where a forced heir was prohibited from claiming his forced portion after
participating in the succession proceeding in which he accepted a
particular bequest and never claimed his forced portion.
a. This case does not offer protection from a claim by an heir
who did not participate in the succession proceeding.
b. It is unclear what is necessary to constitute participation in
the succession proceeding under Succession of Williams.
C. Foreign Trusts (La. R.S. 9:2262.1, et seq., added by Acts 2001,
No. 890, § 1)
1. "Foreign Trust" Definition (La. R.S. 9:2262.1)
A "foreign trust" is any of the following:
a. A trust by which the terms of the trust instrument is
governed by the law of a jurisdiction other than Louisiana; or
b. A trust of which the settlor was domiciled in a jurisdiction
other than Louisiana at the time the trust was created.
2. Recordation ofForeign Trust Instruments (La. R.S. 9:2262.2)
a. If at any time the trust property of a foreign trust includes
an immovable or other property in Louisiana the title to which must
be recorded in order to affect third parties, a trustee shall file the
trust instrument, or an extract thereof, for record in each parish in
which the property is located.
b. For purposes of recording an extract of a trust instrument,
such an extract of a trust instrument either shall be in such form and
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contain such information as may be lawful under the law of the
jurisdiction which the parties have expressly chosen to govern the
trust, or shall be executed by either the settlor or the trustee and
shall include all of the following:
(1) The name of the trust, if any.
(2) The name of each settlor.
(3) The name of the trustee.
(4) The name or other description of the beneficiary or
beneficiaries.
(5) The date of the trust instrument.
(6) A statement whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable.
(7) A description of the immovable property or other property
subject to the trust.
(8) Any other provisions of the trust instrument as the party
executing the extract deems useful.
c. The above-described provisions of La. R.S. 9:2262.2 are
remedial and are applied retroactively to any trust extract previously
filed for record which is in substantial compliance with the
provisions of the section. Such extract shall affect third persons as
of the date (if recordation.
d. Note: This statute is very similar to La. R.S. 9:2092,
which provides substantially the same requirements for recordation
of Louisiana trust instruments or extracts thereof. In In re Latham
Exploration Co., Inc., 83 B.R. 423 (W.D. La. 1988), an assignment
of an overriding royalty interest was made to a Louisiana inter vivos
trust. The overriding royalty interest was made as to mineral lands
located in Point Coupee Parish. Although the assignment was
recorded in Point Coupee Parish, the trust instrument was not. The
court held that a Louisiana trust instrument that was not recorded in
the parish where the immovable trust property was located had "no
force or* [e]ffect as to parties not privy to the unrecorded
transaction." It is possible, and indeed likely, that a Louisiana court
would give the same effect to an unrecorded foreign trust
instrument.
3. Authority of Trustee to Convey (La. R.S. 9:2262.3)
The authoriy of a trustee of a foreign trust or his representative to
execute and deliver a conveyance of immovable property situated in
Louisiana may be evidenced in any manner that is lawful under the law
which the parties have expressly chosen to govern the trust.
4. Form Requirement for Foreign Trusts (La. R.S. 9:2262.4)
A trust intrument executed outside this state in the manner
prescribed by, and in conformity with, the law of the place of its
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execution, or the law of the settlor's domicile, at the time of its
execution shall be deemed to be legally executed and shall have the
same force and effect in this state as if executed in the manner
prescribed by the laws of this state, provided the trust instrument is
in writing and subscribed by the settlor.
5. Addition of Property to Trusts in General
a. A settlor or any other person may make additions of
property to an existing trust by donation inter vivos or mortis causa,
with the approval of the trustee. The right to make additions may be
restricted or denied by the trust instrument. (La. R.S. 9:1931)
b. An addition of property to an existing trust must be made
and accepted in the form required for such a donation free of trust.
(La. R.S. 9:1932)
c. Note: The above-mentioned statutes are found under the
provisions of the Trust Code affecting trusts in general. There is no
jurisprudence applying these provisions to a foreign trust. However,
it is likely that a Louisiana court would apply the form requirements
imposed by the statutes to transfers of additional Louisiana property
into a foreign trust.
D. Usufruct of Land and Minerals
1. A usufruct may be established by a juridical act, either inter
vivos or mortis causa (testament), or by operation of law. The usufruct
created by juridical act is called conventional; the usufruct created by
operation of law is called legal. La. Civ. Code art. 544.
2. A usufruct may also be created by a reservation included in the
act of donation. The donor is permitted to reserve for his own advantage,
or to dispose of for the advantage of any other person, the enjoyment or
usufruct of the immovable property given. La. Civ. Code art. 1533.
3. The rights of the usufructuary and of the naked owner in mines
and quarries are governed by the Louisiana Mineral Code. La. Civ. Code
art. 561.
4. Usufruct of Land
a. The usufruct of land refers to the situation in which title to
the mineral rights is part of the ownership of the land itself.
Example: A husband and wife purchase a tract of land, including
the mineral rights thereto, during their marriage as community
property. The husband subsequently dies intestate, survived by
his wife and children. The wife acquires by operation of law the
usufruct of the husband's community 1/2 interest in the tract of
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b. The general rule is that the usufruct of land does not
include the landowner's rights in minerals, and therefore, the naked
owner of the land has all of the rights in the minerals that he would
have if the land were not subject to the usufruct. La. R.S. 31:188
and La. R.S. 31:195.
Example: A parent donates a tract of land to his children subject
to the reservation of the usufruct. The reservation is silent as to
whether ihe usufruct covers the minerals. Furthermore, at the
time of the donation, there are no producing wells or wells
shown to be productive by a surface production test. In such
case, the usufructuary has no interest in the minerals. The
mineral lease may be executed by the naked owners without the
consent of the usufructuary, and all bonuses, rentals and royalties
are to be paid to the naked owners. However, in enjoying the
rights just described, the naked owners are entitled to use only so
much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for their
operation;, and they are responsible to the usufructuary for the
value of such use and for all damages caused by mining
activities or operations. Furthermore, such rights may not be
exercised in the case of coal or lignite without first obtaining the
consent o: the usufructuary. La. R.S. 31:196.
c. If the usufruct of land is that of parents during marriage,
or any other legal usufruct, or if there is no provision including the
use and enjoyment of mineral rights in a conventional usufruct, the
usufructuary is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the landowner's
rights in minerals as to mines or quarries actually worked at the
time the usujruct was created (the "open mine doctrine"). La. R.S.
31:190(A).
Louisiana Revised Statute 31:191 provides guidance as to what
is considered an "open mine." If at the time a usufruct is created
minerals are being produced from the land or other lands unitized
therewith, or if there is present on the land or other lands unitized
therewith, a well shown by surface production test to be capable of
producing in paying quantities, the usufructuary is entitled to the
use and enjoyment of the landowner's rights in minerals as to all
pools penetrated by the well or wells in question.
d. If the usufruct of land is that of a surviving spouse,
whether legal. (La. Civ. Code art. 890) or conventional (includes
donations inter vivos or mortis causa), and there is no contrary
provision in tie instrument creating the usufruct, the usufructuary is
entitled to the use and enjoyment of the landowner's rights in
minerals, whcther or not mines or quarries were actually worked at
the time the usufruct was created. However, the usufructuary's
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rights do not include the right to execute a mineral lease without the
consent of the naked owner. La. R.S. 31:190(B).
(1) A surviving spouse, as the usufructuary of land, is to
receive all bonuses, rentals and royalties in connection with a
mineral lease. However, the surviving spouse has no authority to
execute a mineral lease without the consent of the naked owners.
The Mineral Code does not provide any incentive for the naked
owners to grant such consent, nor does it provide any relief to the
usufructuary if the naked owners refuse to grant such consent.
(2) The Mineral Code also does not indicate how the naked
owners "consent." Can the naked owners consent in a different
lease? What if this separate lease contains provisions different from
the lease granted by the usufructuary? There is no case law to
interpret these issues.
e. The usufructuary of land has the right to grant a mineral
lease on the estate of which he has the usufruct if his usufruct
includes mineral rights susceptible to leasing. However, any such
lease is extinguished with the termination of the usufruct. La. R.S.
31:118.
5. Usufruct of Minerals
a. The usufruct of mineral rights refers to the situation in
which the ownership of the mineral rights is segregated from the
ownership of the land, such as the usufruct of a mineral servitude,
mineral lease or mineral royalty.
Example: A husband and wife sell a tract of land reserving the
minerals, and the husband subsequently dies intestate survived
by his wife and children. The wife acquires by operation of law
the usufruct of the husband's community 1/2 interest in the
mineral servitude created by this mineral reservation which is
inherited by the children. The usufruct in this situation is a
usufruct of a mineral right.
b; The usufructuary of a mineral right is entitled to all of the
benefits of use and enjoyment that would accrue to him if he were
the owner of the right. The usufructuary may use the right according
to its nature for the duration of his usufruct. La. R.S. 31:193.
c. A usufructuary of a mineral servitude may grant a mineral
lease that extends beyond the term of the usufruct and binds the
naked owner of the servitude. La. R.S. 31:118.
The surviving spouse, as the usufructuary of a mineral right, is
to receive all bonuses, rentals and royalties in connection with a
mineral lease, and the surviving spouse may execute a mineral lease
without the consent of the naked owner(s). Such lease will not
expire at the termination of the usufruct and will bind the naked
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owners without their consent thereto. Upon the termination of the
usufruct, all bonuses, rentals and royalties in connection with a
mineral leas.- flow to the naked owner(s).
VI. Partitions
A. Definition and Purpose
1. Partition is the division or distribution into distinct physical
shares of that which previously has been held in common. Succession of
Ramp, 212 So. 2d 419 (La. 1968).
2. The purpose of a partition is to terminate ownership of
undivided fractional interests in the whole and to create perfect titles in
individual physical portions of the former whole. Succession of Ramp,
212 So. 2d 419 (La. 1968).
B. General Ru les from Louisiana Civil Code Articles
1. No one may be compelled to hold a thing in indivision with
another unless the contrary has been provided by law or juridical act.
Any co-owner has a right to demand partition of a thing held in
indivision. Partition may be excluded by agreement for up to fifteen
years or for such other period as provided in La. R.S. 9:1702 or other
specific law. La. Civ. Code art. 807.
2. Partition of a thing held in indivision is excluded when its use
is indispensable for the enjoyment of another thing owned by one or
more of the co-owners. La. Civ. Code art. 808.
3. The mode of partition may be determined by agreement of all
the co-owners. In the absence of such an agreement, a co-owner may
demand judicial partition. La. Civ. Code art. 809.
4. The court shall decree partition in kind when the thing held in
indivision is susceptible to division into as many lots of nearly equal
value as there are shares and the aggregate value of all lots is not
significantly lower than the value of the property in the state of
indivision. La. Civ. Code art. 810.
5. When the thing held in indivision is not susceptible to partition
in kind, the court shall decree a partition by licitation or by private sale
and the proceeds shall be distributed to the co-owners in proportion to
their shares. La. Civ. Code art. 811.
6. When a thing held in indivision is partitioned in kind or by
licitation, a real right burdening the thing is not affected. La. Civ. Code
art. 812.
7. When a thing is partitioned in kind, a real right that burdens the
share of a co-owner attaches to the part of the thing allotted to him. La.
Civ. Code art. 813.
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C. Common Problem Areas
1. Failure to Include all Co-Owners
a. General Rule from the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
When one of the co-owners of property sought to be partitioned
is an absentee, the partition may be effected by licitation, as
provided in this Chapter, whether the property is divisible in kind or
not. La. C.C.P. art. 4621.
b. General Rules from the Louisiana Revised Statutes
(1) Where real property is partitioned, either in kind or by
licitation, by either judicial or conventional partition the fact that
one or more co-owners are not parties thereto shall not affect the
validity of such partition as to the co-owners who are parties thereto
or their heirs or assigns; provided that the rights of any co-owner
not a party to such partition shall not be affected thereby and the
interest of such co-owner in the property partitioned shall remain
the same as if the property had not been partitioned. La. R.S.
13:4985 (added by Acts 1952).
Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4985 overruled the prior holding
of Sun Oil Co. v. Smith, 43 So. 2d 148 (La. 1949), where the court
held that a partition in which all of the co-owoers are not
represented is absolutely null with no effect on any party to the
partition.
(2) Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4985 through 13:4990 shall
affect partitions heretofore or hereafter effected; provided that any
co-owner of real property heretofore partitioned or his heirs or
assigns, where one or more co-owners were not parties, shall have a
period of six months from and after July 30, 1952 within which to
file suit to set aside such partition, and if no such suit is filed within
said period such partition shall be valid for all purposes as to the
interest of the co-owners who were parties thereto. La. R.S.
13:4986.
(3) The term "co-owner" as used in Louisiana Revised Statute
13:4985 through 13:4990 is defined as the owner of any interest in
the real property partitioned or any interest affecting such real
property which renders such co-owner a proper party to a partition
thereof. La. R.S. 13:4987.
(4) The provisions of Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4985
through 13:4990 shall be effective as to all parties including
absentees, minors, and interdicts. La. R.S. 13:4988.
(5) Nothing in Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4985 through
13:4990 shall prevent any court in any judicial proceeding in which
real property is sought to be partitioned, upon proper motion or
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exception, from ordering that any co-owner not then a party be
joined as a party thereto. La. R.S. 13:4989.
(6) In any judicial proceeding in which real property is sought
to be partitioned upon the trial of the cause upon the merits or upon
confirmation of any preliminary default therein, due proof shall be
made of a Iiligent effort on the part of the plaintiff to locate all co-
owners of the property to be partitioned and that all known co-
owners have been made parties thereto. La. R.S. 13:4990.
c. Note: As a general rule, co-owners are deemed to possess
property on behalf of the other co-owners. However, it has been
held that the filing of an act of partition can rebut this presumption.
Prescription of 30 years begins to run immediately on execution of
an act of partition, which constitutes notice that subsequent
possession of property is adverse and hostile. See Minton v.
Whitworth, 393 So. 2d 294 (La. App. I Cir. 1980), Dupuis v.
Broadhursi, 213 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1968) and Towles v.
Heirs of M~rrison, 428 So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983).
2. Single or Multiple Mineral Servitudes
A question can arise as to whether a partition creates one mineral
servitude covering all of the partitioned land or multiple servitudes, each
affecting one of the partitioned tracts.
a. Three possible scenarios can arise depending on the way a
partition is interpreted. For example, assume three co-owners (A, B
and C) own a contiguous tract of land which is comprised of three
equally sized and equally valued tracts (1, 2 and 3). The partition of
this land could produce the following results:
(1) Scenario #1 - Each partitioner receives his tract in full
ownership, including the mineral rights;
Example:Tract 1 - full ownership to A.
Tract 2 -- full ownership to B.
Tract 3 .- full ownership to C.
(2) Scenario #2 - One mineral servitude is created covering
the entire tract being partitioned and each of the partitioners owns
their respective percentage of the servitude which affects all tracts.
Example:Tract 1 - surface ownership to A.
Tract 2 - surface ownership to B.
Tract 3 - surface ownership to C.
One mineral servitude affecting Tracts 1, 2 and 3; owned by A,
B and C in -he proportion of 1/3 each.
(3) Scenario #3 - Each of the partitioners receives his tract
and his pericentage of the mineral rights affecting that tract and the
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remaining mineral rights affecting his tract are held by the
remaining partitioners in the form of a servitude.
Example: Tract I - A owns the surface of Tract I and 1/3 of the
minerals. The remaining 2/3 mineral interest is owned in the
form of a mineral servitude in favor of B and C.
Tract 2 - B owns the surface of Tract 2 and 1/3 of the minerals.
The remaining 2/3 mineral interest is owned in the form of a
mineral servitude in favor of A and C.
Tract 3 - C owns the surface of Tract 3 and 1/3 of the minerals.
The remaining 2/3 mineral interest is owned in the form of a
mineral servitude in favor of A and B.
b. General Rules from the Louisiana Mineral Code Articles:
(1) The owners of several contiguous tracts of land may
establish a single mineral servitude in favor of one or more of them
or of a third party. La. R.S. 31:66.
(2) Co-owners of land constituting a continuous whole may
partition it and reserve a single mineral servitude in favor of one or
more of them. La. R.S. 31:67.
c. General Rules from Louisiana Case Law:
(1) When a provision in a partition is ambiguous, it should be
interpreted based on the intent of the parties, as well as other
principles of contractual construction. Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard,
197 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1967), writ refused, 199 So. 2d 923
(La. 1967).
(2) When a provision in a partition is ambiguous, the proper
interpretation is that which least restricts the ownership of the land
conveyed. Servitudes, which tend to affect the free use of property,
in case of doubt as to their extent or the manner of use, are
interpreted in favor of the owner of the property being affected.
Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1967),
writ refused, 199 So. 2d 923 (La. 1967); Allied Chemical Corp. v.
Dye, 441 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983), writ denied, 449 So. 2d
119 (La. 1984).
(3) When a provision in a partition is ambiguous, extrinsic
evidence is admissible to assist in determining the intent of the
parties. (See Allied Chemical Corp. v. Dye, 441 So. 2d 776 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1983), writ denied, 449 So. 2d 119 (La. 1984), where
the attorney who prepared the partition testified as to the intent of
the parties. See also Wall v. Leger, 402 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 1 Cir.
1981) wherein the court examined the subsequent actions of the
parties to determine their intent.)
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(4) The following partition provisions have been interpreted
by Louisiana courts as creating multiple mineral servitudes, as
shown above in Scenario #3:
(a) "It is specifically agreed and understood that this partition
shall not cover or affect the minerals lying in, on, under, or that may
be produced from, the property herein partitioned." Allied Chemical
Corp. v. Dye, 441 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983), writ denied,
449 So. 2d 119 (La. 1984). The court in Allied Chemical focused on
the intent of the parties not to "affect the minerals." The court went
on to say that:
"An agreement which provides that this unsevered right to
search for minerals and grant a servitude shall remain unaffected
cannot he interpreted to mean that his mineral ownership has
changed in form from an element of perfect ownership to an
undivided interest in a Servitude over the property received."
There was no language within the document and no evidence
presented to indicate that the parties intended to have a single
servitude over all the minerals. The court found that the language
quoted above was intended to preclude the loss by each party of his
share of the minerals under the tracts received by the other parties to
the partition.
(b) ". . . (it is) the intention hereof that The lot allotted to Each
of the said parties shall be subject to oil, gas and mineral royalty
rights vested in the other parties and in the said Richard 0. Eckhart
to the extent of a total of forty per centum (40%) thereof, leaving
vested in the owner of Each of said lots sixty per centum (60%) of
all of such royalties to accrue under any lease or other contract
affecting said land. . . ." Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672
(La. App. 3 Cir. 1967), writ refused, 199 So. 2d 923 (La. 1967). The
court in Whitehall determined that the instrument could be
interpreted either way, and therefore, it should be interpreted in the
way which least restricts the ownership of the land conveyed.
(5) The following partition provisions have been interpreted
by Louisiana courts as creating a single mineral servitude, as shown
above in Scenario #2:
(a) "It is clearly understood and agreed between the parties
hereto that the ownership in the oil, gas and minerals, and oil, gas
and mineral rights, are not in any way changed or effected (sic) by
this partition, and the co-parceners hereto, hereby declare and
acknowledge that the oil, gas and mineral and oil, gas and mineral
rights in each and every tract of land hereinabove allocated to each
of him, her or them, is owned by the parties hereinafter named, in
the proportion set out after each name, to-wit:" (names and
proportions omitted) Wall v. Leger, 402 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 1 Cir.
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1981). The court in Wall focused on the subsequent actions of the
parties, who were treating the instrument as though it created a
single mineral servitude.
(b) "It is understood and agreed, however, that no partition is
made of the mineral interest and the parties shall continue to remain
as owners in indivision with respect to the oil, gas and other
minerals in, on and under the property herein partitioned." GMB
Gas Corp. v. Cox, 340 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1976). In
deciding the case, the court said, "the partition agreement.. .leaves no
doubt that they intended to own the minerals under the entire 400
acre tract in indivision and to create a single mineral servitude...."
d. To avoid these types of constructional problems, the
drafter of an act of partition should clearly state that the parties do
or do not intend to create a single mineral servitude on the
partitioned land. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral
Servitudes, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1097 (1987).
D. Partition by Licitation of Land: Effect on Mineral Rights
1. In Steele v. Denning, 456 So. 2d 992 (La. 1984), the plaintiffs,
who owned an undivided interest in land but none of the attendant
mineral rights, sued for partition of both the land and mineral rights.
Each of the defendant co-owners of the land owned attendant mineral
rights. The court held that the plaintiffs did not hold a thing "in common"
with the defendant co-owners with respect to the mineral rights.
Therefore, the court found that the plaintiffs did not have the right to
provoke the partition of the mineral rights along with the partition of the
land.
2. It is unclear whether the mineral interests would be subject to a
partition in a scenario opposite of Steele - where a plaintiff owns a full
interest in the land, including the mineral rights, the defendant owns
none of the mineral rights, and the mineral interest owner is not made a
party to the suit. According to Steele, the mineral rights would not be
held "in common" between the parties.
3. In Footnote 8 in Steele, the court wrote:
"Plaintiffs' argument would be correct, for example, in this case, if a
full owner of an undivided interest in the property, like Denning,
had brought the partition action. Denning, being a full owner of the
land (with the attendant mineral rights), holds elements of
ownership in both the land and the mineral rights, and thus, owns
"a thing held in common" with all of the other co-owners. As such,
unlike plaintiffs here, she has the right to petition for partition by
licitation of both the land and the mineral rights. And then, "if ...
the land is judicially partitioned," with the mineral right owner
being made a party to the partition action, and the appropriate
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appraisals are made in accordance with law, the mineral right
owner will share in the proceeds in proportion to the value of his
interest and his mineral rights would be extinguished by the sale of
the property resulting from the partition action." (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
One could argue that this footnote would not apply where the
plaintiff in the partition action owned the attendant mineral rights but
none of the defendants owned the attendant mineral rights. In such a
situation, the plaintiffs would not own mineral rights in common with
any of the de::endants. Furthermore, this footnote clearly conditions the
extinguishment of the mineral rights upon making the mineral right
owner a party to the partition action and upon obtaining the appropriate
appraisals in accordance with the Mineral Code.
4. If the owner of a mineral right or interest therein is made a
party to an action for partition of the land subject to his right and it is
determined that the partition is to be by licitation, the court shall appoint
two appraisers who shall separately value the interest in the land or the
mineral rights of each party to the action who is or may be entitled to
participate in the proceeds of the sale. La. R.S. 31:180.
a. If an appraisal of any mineral right is not made in
accordance with Article 180, the partition is not invalid, but the
right or any interest therein is not extinguished or otherwise
affected. La. R.S. 31:184.
b. In Thigpen v. Boswell, 465 So.2d 865 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1985), a defendant in a partition proceeding who owned mineral
rights in and to the subject property argued that the mineral rights
were not transferred where the appraisals were not made prior to the
sheriff's sale. It is unclear from the court's opinion whether said
defendant owned an interest in the land and the minerals or only a
mineral servitude in and to the subject property. The court held that
in order for the mineral rights to be transferred in the sale, the
appraisals. must be made prior to the sheriffs sale effecting the
partition by licitation.
c. It is unclear whether the appraisal requirements of La.
R.S. 31:1 30 apply in a partition proceeding where the plaintiff owns
both the land and mineral rights and the defendant owns only the
land. An issue remains regarding whether an appraisal is required
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